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Corporate involvement in public health policy is being
obscured
Plain packaging policy should be developed in plain sight
Jeff Collin professor of global health policy, Sarah Hill senior lecturer
Global Public Health Unit, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK
The government in England, having previously indicated its
intention to follow Australia’s lead in legislating for plain
packaging for cigarettes, has reportedly abandoned this public
health initiative.1 This policy U turn was met with dismay from
tobacco control advocates,2 jubilation by the tobacco industry,
and an increase in tobacco share prices.1 Plans to introduce a
minimum unit price for alcohol in England andWales were also
recently jettisoned after intensive lobbying by industry.
Furthermore, the government has abandoned its plan to introduce
a statutory register of lobbyists (signalled in its coalition
agreement).3
These public health casualties of the government’s midterm
travails reinforce concerns about the role of the commercial
sector in public health policy. Corporate involvement in public
health is epitomised by a Public Health Responsibility Deal that
privileges initiatives favoured by the alcohol and processed food
industries.4 The absence of a statutory register of lobbyists
underlines a continuing lack of transparency because it means
that private companies can petition to take over health
campaigns or reform the NHSwithout the public’s knowledge.5
Doubts about the current direction of health policy are
exacerbated by the opaque nature of the process through which
the recent shift has occurred. The retreat over plain packaging
of cigarettes reportedly followed counsel fromDavid Cameron’s
adviser Lynton Crosby, a former tobacco lobbyist, to “scrape
the barnacles off the boat.”3 The government has yet to respond
to last year’s consultation on standardised packaging of tobacco
products—a delay that is itself being used to justify
non-disclosure of written submissions.
Surprisingly, our recent request under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 for submissions made by cigarette
manufacturers and their allies was rejected, with the Department
of Health citing the qualified exemption (under section 35 of
the Act) for information relating to the formulation or
development of government policy.Yet theDepartment of Health
has previously disclosed more obviously sensitive documents
following requests from the tobacco industry—including detailed
correspondence between health officials in the United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand.6
In practice, freedom of information legislation seems to have
enabled corporations to protect their interests more effectively
than it has enhanced public scrutiny. Tobacco companies have
repeatedly used public record acts to undermine health policy
by flooding officials with requests for information, subjecting
staff to “a high degree of scrutiny from an industry with
unlimited legal resources.”7 PhilipMorris invoked the Freedom
of Information Act in repeated attempts to extract confidential
records from researchers at the University of Stirling.8 In
addition, Japan Tobacco International based its recent high
profile campaign against plain packaging on correspondence
between government officials obtained through a freedom of
information request.
It is ironic that minutes of a meeting in January 2013 attended
by Department of Health officials and Imperial Tobacco include
details of assurances that confidential data supplied by the
company “would not normally need to be disclosed under
[freedom of information] requests because of an exemption to
protect commercial interests.”9 In the specific context of
government interactions with tobacco companies, however,
obligations to ensure transparency extend beyond the minimal
requirements of the Act. As a party to the World Health
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC), the UK has recognised its commitments under article
5.3 “to protect the development of public health policy from
the vested interests of the tobacco industry.”10 Full
implementation of such commitments would require the
government to “ensure that any interaction with the tobacco
industry on matters related to tobacco control or public health
is accountable and transparent.” This would also have to “be
conducted in public, for example through public hearings, public
notice of interactions, [and] disclosure of records of such
interactions to the public.”11 The government’s interpretation
of article 5.3 has been more limited in, for example, exempting
disclosure of details of discussions between the tobacco industry
and HM Revenue and Customs. But even within this narrow
interpretation, obligations under the framework are surely
breached by the rejection of a freedom of information request
for tobacco industry submissions on the grounds that policy
discussions are ongoing.
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Corporate opposition to minimum unit pricing for alcohol and
plain cigarette packaging illustrates the inevitable tensions
between the interests of the commercial sector and the protection
of public health. The current UK government is by no means
unique in failing to reconcile these competing interests, and
there is increasing international recognition of the need to
develop more coherent public health responses to unhealthy
commodity industries.12But whatever governments decide when
adjudicating between competing priorities, both public health
and the wider public interest in accountability require sufficient
transparency to enable clear understanding of the processes by
which decisions are reached and the evidence on which they
are based. By these standards, the government’s failure to decide
on plain packaging policy in plain sight clearly falls short of
minimal expectations. To adapt the metaphor du jour,
commitments to transparency are integral to good
government—not mere “barnacles.”
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